Sunday, October 21, 2012

The theories of normal accidents and high reliability



 The foundations of normal accident theory were laid by Perrow (1984) and consolidated by Sagan (1993).

The theory holds that accidents are a normal consequence of interactive complexity and close coupling of an organizational system. The measure of interactive complexity is the number of ways in which components of the system can interact. It represents the number of variables in the system, the number of relationships between the variables and the number of feedback loops through which the variables interact. Typically, interactive complexity increases with the technology incorporated into the system. The measure of close coupling is the speed at which a change in one variable cascades through the system to cause changes in other system variables.
Close coupling represents tightness in the process, which is influenced by such things as component redundancy, resource buffers/slack, and process flexibility. The idea behind normal accident theory is that some of the system responses to change are unforeseen, are causes of incidents, and can potentially lead to catastrophes. Using the analogy of safety defenses being like slices of Swiss cheese (Reason, 1997), normal accident theory would say that no matter how high you stack the slices it is inevitable that organizational. 
juggling will cause a set of holes to line up eventually and the defenses will be breached.
High-reliability theory is a competing organizational theory of accidents whose proponents such as La Porte and Consolini (1991), Roberts and Bea (2001), and Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) believe that, while accidents may be normal, serious ones can be prevented by implementing certain organizational practices. For example, Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) suggest that high-reliability organizations implement business processes to instill “mindfulness” qualities into the organization, which include preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise.

Sagan (1993) distils high-reliability theory down to four essential elements for success: high management priority on safety and reliability; redundancy and backup for people and equipment; decentralized organization with a strong culture and commitment to training; and organizational learning through trial and error, supported by anticipation and simulation. From the perspective
of normal accident theory, he argues that the organizational learning required for the success of high-reliability theory will be restricted for several reasons. These include ambiguity about incident causation, the politicized environments in which incident investigation takes place, the human tendency to cover up mistakes, and the secrecy both within and between competing organizations.

Thus, to promote the necessary learning, it seems clear that a formal organizational system for learning from incidents is required. The theory of incident learning relies on the observation made by Turner (1978) that disasters have long incubation periods during which warning signals (or incidents) are not detected or are ignored. Thus, while the occurrence of incidents may be normal, an organization with an effective incident learning system can respond to these incidents to prevent serious accidents from occurring in the future.

Incident learning is not unlike the continuous improvement cycle described by Repenning and Sterman (2001). An organization effectively implementing a formal incident learning system may evolve into a high-reliability organization over time.

The theory of incident learning:

To help understand why incidents happen, and why we need to learn from them, it is useful to introduce the concept of a risk system. As shown in Figure 1, it is inseparable from the business system that generates the useful outputs of the organization. However, we can gain valuable insights from thinking of them as distinct systems. Although incidents are actually unwanted outputs of the
business system, it is instructive to view them as outputs of the risk system. The risk system may be hidden from view, but its outputs are real enough.

 
 

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